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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
There is an intimation that the examiner should have allowed objections
to his proposed findings. Yet the Court repeats the language of the first
Morgan Case to the effect that while this is good practice, it is not essen-
tial to the validity of the proceedings. 8
The Mackay Case9 holds that no particular procedure is essential. It
requires only that the opposing party know the claims of the government
with opportunity to meet them. As long as the parties know the issues
involved and have an opportunity to meet them, there is no error merely
because the examiner has not prepared a list of proposed findings or be-
cause the complaint does not accurately state the government's claim.
In the second Morgan Case the Court intimates that a "full hearing"
required by the statute includes no more than the fundamental requirements
of fairness which are the essence of due process. The Mackay Case seems
to be a decision on due process. The Court does not attempt to distinguish
the cases, however; it simply suggests, in refusing the motion for a re-
hearingO in the Morgan Case, that they be compared."1 The Morgan Case
stresses the complexity of the evidence and exhibits, while the Mackay
Case calls attention to the fact that there was only a single issue, which
was known to both parties. The Morgan Case as supplemented by the
Mackay Case would seem to indicate that the Court will consider the op-
portunity to know the claims of the opposing parties and to meet them
as to each case, without compelling the administrative agency to follow any
set procedure.
R. M. R.
APPEAL AND ERROR-COURT RULES-BRIES-[Missouri].-Two recent
Missouri cases involved the enforcement of court rules regulating briefs.
The Kansas City Court of Appeals, under a strict construction of the rules,
dismissed an appeal because the "statement" did not fully inform the court
of all facts essential to an understanding of the case." The St. Louis Court
of Appeals, however, denied a motion to dismiss an appeal where there was
a failure to present "points and authorities" separate from the "argument"
inasmuch as the appellant had made separate and distinct assignments of
8. This is reasserted by the court in denying the petition for rehearing
in the Morgan Case, (1938) 6 U. S. Law Week 15.
9. National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.(1938) 58 S. Ct. 905.
10. (1938) 6 U. S. Law Week 15.
11. Nowhere in either the Mackay Case or on the motion for rehearing
in the Morgan Case does the court profess to distinguish them on the
ground that the Morgan Case arose under the statutory requirement for a
"full hearing" and the Mackay Case under due process. Neither did it rely
on the distinction that the Morgan Case was entirely heard by the trial
examiner while the Mackay Case was removed to Washington and the oral
arguments heard before the Board. These two possible distinctions between
the cases are factually present, however.
1. Evans v. Hilliard (Kansas City Ct. of App. 1938) 112 S. W. (2d) 886.
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error and had applied the points and authorities to them in the "argument"
proper.2
Court rules provide for a "statement," an "assignment of errors," and
"points and authorities."3 The application of these rules has at times been
strictly mandatory.4 In other instances, and especially more recently, they
have been regarded as discretionary to a certain degree.5
When the brief does not contain a "statement,"O the appeal may be
immediately dismissed either upon motion by the respondent 7 or at the
discretion of the court itself.8 Furthermore, if the statement is not clear,
concise, and informative9 as to all material facts and issues of the case, a
dismissal usually results.10 The court, following the general rule, will not
2. McNicholas v. Continental Baking Co. (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1938)
112 S. W. (2d) 849.
3. Sup. Ct. Rule 15, St. Louis Ct. of App. Rule 18, Kansas City Ct. of
App. Rules 16 and 17, Springfield Ct. of App. Rule 18.
4. Pfotenhauer v. Ridgway (1925) 307 Mo. 529, 271 S. W. 50; Terry v.
Ingraham (Kansas City Ct. of App. 1928) 12 S. W. (2d) 763.
5. Cox v. Orr (1929) 322 Mo. 207, 14 S. W. (2d) 440, 441; Houck v.
Bridwell (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1888) 28 Mo. App. 644; Oberdan v. Evans
and Howard Fire Brick Co. (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1927) 296 S. W. 161;
Paulo v. Forum Lunch Co. (Kansas City Ct. of App. 1929) 225 Mo. App.
167, 171; 19 S. W. (2d) 510; Foman v. Liberty Life Ins. Co. (Kansas City
Ct. of App. 1932) 227 Mo. App. 70, 51 S. W. (2d) 212.
6. Opposing counsel cannot waive the court rule as to the "statement."
Wade v. Bankers' Life Ass'n (Kansas City Ct. of App. 1910) 145 Mo. App.
172, 129 S. W. 1004; Euler v. State Highway Commission of Mo. (Kansas
City Ct. of App. 1932) 227 Mo. App. 655, 55 S. W. (2d) 719.
7. Terry v. Ingraham (Kansas City Ct. of App. 1928) 12 S. W. (2d)
763; Bank of Meta v. Schnitzer (Kansas City Ct. of App. 1934) 67 S. W.
(2d) 106; Williams v. Jenkins (Springfield Ct. of App. 1937) 107 S. W.
(2d) 938.
8. Royal v. Kansas City Western Ry. Co. (Mo. 1916) 190 S. W. 573;
Southwick v. Southwick (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1903) 99 Mo. App. 156, 72
S. W. (2d) 477.
9. "Statement" should not include argument. Wheeler v. Shull (Kansas
City Ct. of App. 1926) 282 S. W. 61, 62; National Refining Co. v. Chandler
(Kansas City Ct. of App. 1934) 71 S. W. (2d) 482; St. Louis Ct. of App.
Rule 18; Kansas City Ct. of App. Rule 16; Springfield Ct. of App. Rule 18.
A "statement" setting forth the testimony in the light most favorable to
the appellant and ignoring that favorable to the respondent has been held
to violate the court rule. National Refining Co. v. Chandler, supra.
10. Farm Mortgage and Loan Co. v. Schubert (Mo. App. 1925) 271
S. W. 873 (no mention of trial of the case or judgment rendered; argu-
ment included); Daniel v. Burns (Mo. App. 1926) 283 S. W. 749 (no infor-
mation as to how accident happened); Loomis v. Phoenix Ins. Co. (Mo.
App. 1928) 10 S. W. (2d) 956; Carter Motor Co. v. Miller's Garage and
Contracting Co. (1931) 226 Mo. App. 551, 45 S. W. (2d) 101; Mason v.
Warnke (1932) 226 Mo. App. 1244, 49 S. W. (2d) 200; Glaze v. Mutual
Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n (Mo. App. 1934) 74 S. W. (2d) 96;
LeClair v. LeClair (Mo. App. 1934) 77 S. W. (2d) 863; McDonnell v.
Hawkeye Life Ins. Co. (Kansas City Ct. of App. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d) 389;
Peck v. Great American Inc. Co. (1936) 230 Mo. App. 325, 90 S. W. (2d)
415. All of the above cases wore decided by the Kansas City Court of
Appeals.
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"spy out those things essential to a statement" in the transcript.". Resort
has been had to the transcript or record where the time required was not
great12 and where the court wished to prevent substantial injustice.13 Coun-
sel from another state has not been held to the ordinarily strict insistence
on compliance with the rule.' 4 Missouri follows the common practice in
holding that a "statement" in the respondent's brief which complies with
court rules remedies any defects in the appellant's "statement.".15 The
questions of the clarity, conciseness, and sufficiency of the "statement"
is dependent on the facts and issues raised by the particular circumstances
of each appeal. 16 It seems that the Kansas City Court of Appeals in apply-
ing these requirements has dismissed a far greater number of appeals for
failure of "statement" than either the St. Louis or Springfield Courts of
Appeals. The Kansas City Court of Appeals has intimated that a poor
"statement" by the appellant would be inadequate even though cleared up
by the remainder of his brief.17 Because of certain liberal decisions,' 8 it is
submitted that the St. Louis Court of Appeals would not take that position.
In general there is less insistence on strict compliance with the court
rules as to the form of the "assignments of error" and "points and authori-
ties." 9 Where the errors complained of were not distinctly and separately
set out as required by rule,2 0 or a defective assignment of error was cleared
up by "points and authorities,""21 or assignment of error was not made
separately but included under "points and authorities," 22 or no assignment
of errors was made but the interpretation of an important statute was
involved, 23 motions for dismissal of appeal have been denied.' 4 Similarly,
11. Flanagan Milling Co. v. City of St. Louis (1910) 222 Mo. 306, 309,
121 S. W. 112, 13.
12. Foman v. Liberty Life Ins. Co. (Kansas City Ct. of App. 1932) 227
Mo. App. 70, 51 S. W. (2d) 212.
13. Spragne v. Mathias (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1910) 148 Mo. App. 169,
127 S. W. 668.
14. Universal Credit Co. v. Vanansdal (Springfield Ct. of App. 1937) 106
S. W. (2d) 539.
15. Charlesworth v. I. & L. Typesetting Co. (Kansas City Ct. of App.
1936) 90 S. W. (2d) 423, 424.
16. LeClair v. LeClair (Mo. App. 1934) 77 S. W. (2d) 863.
17. McDonnell v. Hawkeye Insurance Co. (Kansas City Ct. of App. 1935)
84 S. W. (2d) 387.
18. Houck v. Bridwell, Oberdan v. Evens and Howard Fire Brick Co.
(St. Louis Ct. of App. 1888) 28 Mo. App. 644.
19. Round Prairie Bank of Fillmore et al. v. Downey (Kansas City Ct.
of App. 1933) 64 S. W. (2d) 701.
20. Central Fibre Products Co. v. Bacher et al. (Kansas City Ct. of
App. 1937) 112 S. W. (2d) 372.
21. Cavanaugh v. Dyer (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1919) 215 S. W. 481;
Endres v. Hadeler (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1920) 220 S. W. 1002; Rees v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1923) 251 S. W. 395.
22. Cox v. Orr (1929) 322 Mo. 207, 14 S. W. (2d) 440, 441; Collier v.
Lead Co. (1907) 208 Mo. 246, 259, 106 S. W. 971; Aulgur v. Strodtman
(1932) 329 Mo. 738, 46 S. W. (2d) 172; Galbreath v. Galbreath (Kansas
City Ct. of App. 1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 202; Rathbone v. Rathbun (Spring-
field Ct. of App. 1937) 35 S. W. (2d) 38.
23. State v. Caldwell (1925) 310 Mo. 397, 276 S. W. 631.
24. No assignment of errors can be made after attention has been called
to their omission by the filing of a motion to dismiss the appeal. Quigley
1938]
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where the points were not stated "in numerical order" as required by the
rule, a motion to dismiss was denied as the court was able to understand
the theory of the appeal. 25 The St. Louis Court of Appeals has considered
an assignment of error where no mention of points or citation of authorities
was made.26
Both of the instant cases are in line with the weight of authority-the
appellant being held strictly to the rule in the case of a defective statement
while a deviation was permitted in the manner of presenting "points and
authorities." It is recognized that the rules of court have been laid down to
achieve an efficient and time-saving method of expediting appellate proce-
dure.27 However, it should be remembered that justice for the litigants is
the desired end of court proceedings. Accordingly they should not be penal-
ized for lack of skill of counsel unless reasonably necessary. It is submitted,
therefore, that it might be well to permit amendments of the "statement"
at the discretion of the court even after the respondent has filed a motion
to dismiss. 28 This would be to the advantage of the court in permitting a
strict enforcement of the rule for clear and concise statements without
unfairly subjecting the appellant to dismissal or to continuance at the
option of the respondent.
J. FI. F.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COURTS--THE DOCTRINE OF SWIFT v. TYSON-
[Federal] .- Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, brought suit in federal
court against appellant for injuries received while walking beside appellant's
tracks in Pennsylvania. Following the long-settled doctrine of Swift a'.
Tyson,1 the circuit court of appeals2 affirmed the district court's action in
declining to inquire into the Pennsylvania decisions with 'regard to the duty
owed by a railroad to licensees. Having granted certiorari, the Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis, disapproved the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson, holding it an unconstitutional assumption of power by the
courts of the United States.4
Litho. Co. v. Linda Vista Golf and Country Club (Kansas City Ct. of App.
1928) 1 S. W. (2d) 851.
25. Neff v. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World (Kansas City Ct. of
App. 1931) 226 Mo. App. 899, 48 S. W. (2d) 564.
26. Grubb v. Curry (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1934) 72 S. W. (2d) 863.
27. Williams v. Jenkins (Springfield Ct. of App. 1937) 107 S. W. (2d)
938.
28. A possible analogy might be drawn from cases in which the appellant
was permitted to present a supplemental abstract after the respondent had
filed a motion to dismiss. Davis v. Camp (Springfield Ct. of App. 1909)
139 Mo. App. 650, 123 S. W. 1009. Contra as to amending "statement":
Fuenfgeld v. Holt (Kansas City Ct. of App. 1934) 70 S. W. (2d) 143.
1. (1842) 41 U. S. 7, 10 L. ed. 865.
2. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (C. C. A. 2, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 603.
3. The Erie Co. desired to show that Pennsylvania decisions held that
railroads owed to those using longitudinal pathways alongside their tracks,
as distinguished from a crossing, only the duty owed trespassers.
4. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 303 U. S. -, 58 S. Ct. 817,
82 L. ed. 787, Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice McReynolds dissenting.
Mr. Justice Reed concurred in part.
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